

The Mutual Fund Industry Today: “Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere”*

John C. Bogle

**United States Securities
And Exchange Commission
Asset Management Unit**


April 28, 2015

*Title of a speech by Julie Riewe, Co-Chief of
Asset Management Unit, Division of Enforcement



NOTE: The views I express in this speech and the visuals that follow are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vanguard’s present management.

A Tiny Industry Grows into a Behemoth




Mutual Fund Industry Leaders: Then and Now

| Rank | 1951 Fund Name | Total Assets* (Millions) | 2015 Manager Name | Total Assets (Billions) |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | M.I.T. | \$472 | Vanguard | \$2,988 |
| 2 | Investors Mutual | 365 | Fidelity | 1,615 |
| 3 | Keystone Funds | 213 | BlackRock | 1,230 |
| 4 | Tri-Continental | 209 | American Funds | 1,216 |
| 5 | Affiliated Funds | 209 | JPMorgan Funds | 519 |
| 6 | Wellington Fund | 194 | State Street | 497 |
| 7 | Dividend Shares | 186 | T Rowe Price | 493 |
| 8 | Fundamental Investors | 179 | Franklin Templeton | 480 |
| 9 | State Street Investment | 106 | PIMCO | 375 |
| 10 | Boston Fund | 106 | Federated | 272 |
| Total | | \$2,239 | Total | \$9,686 |
| Percentage of Industry | | 72% | Percentage of Industry | 57% |

Total industry assets: \$3.1 billion. Total industry assets: \$16.9 trillion.
*Includes associated funds.

Huge Growth in the Number of Funds



Number of Funds—1951 & Today

5.

Major Mutual Fund Groups

| Original Name | 1951 | | Current Name | 2014 | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| | Total Assets (Millions) | No. of Funds Managed | | Total Assets (Billions) | No. of Funds Managed |
| M.I.T. | \$472 | 2 | MFS | \$180 | 78 |
| Investors Mutual | 365 | 3 | Columbia | 165 | 116 |
| Affiliated | 209 | 3 | Lord Abbett | 108 | 37 |
| Wellington | 194 | 1 | Vanguard | 2,988 | 140 |
| Eaton & Howard | 90 | 2 | Eaton Vance | 101 | 130 |
| Fidelity | 64 | 1 | Fidelity | 1,615 | 321 |
| Putnam | 52 | 1 | Putnam | 81 | 77 |
| American | 27 | 2 | American | 1216 | 35 |
| T. Rowe Price | 1 | 1 | T. Rowe Price | 493 | 116 |
| Dreyfus | 0.8 | 1 | Dreyfus | 248 | 151 |
| Total/Average | \$1,475 | 1.7 | Total/Average | \$7,195 | 120 |

Note: 12 of today's 20 largest firms did not exist (or did not manage mutual funds) in 1951, including BlackRock, PIMCO, State Street Global, and JP Morgan

Mutual Fund Expense Ratios 1951 and 2015


6.

| | 1951 | 2015 | Change |
|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|
| Conventional Industry Model | | | |
| MIT/MFS (C) | 0.42% | 1.29% | +208% |
| Investors Mutual/Columbia (C) | 0.56 | 1.15 | 105 |
| Eaton Howard/Eaton Vance (SH) | 0.64 | 1.27 | 99 |
| Putnam (C) | 0.66 | 1.31 | 98 |
| Fidelity (P) | 0.63 | 1.06 | 68 |
| T. Rowe Price (SH) | 0.50 | 0.84 | 68 |
| Affiliated/Lord Abbett (P) | 0.75 | 1.12 | 49 |
| American (P) | 0.84 | 0.99 | 17 |
| Average | 0.62% | 1.13% | +80% |
| New Industry Model | | | |
| Wellington/Vanguard (M) | 0.55% | 0.17 | -69% |
| Dollars | | | |
| Conventional Model | \$7.1M | \$41.1B | 5.8x |
| New Model | \$1.1M | \$5.1B | 4.6x |

Ownership types: (C) Conglomerate, (SH) public shareholders, (P) private, (M) mutual

Changing Composition by Asset Class 1945-2015

7.



Equity Funds—Less Predictability More Risk

8.


| Relative Volatility* | 1951-56 | 2009-15** | Difference |
|----------------------|---------|-----------|------------|
| Over 1.11 | 0% | 18% | +18% |
| 0.95-1.11 | 34 | 53 | +19 |
| 0.85-0.94 | 30 | 16 | -14 |
| 0.70-0.84 | 36 | 10 | -24 |
| Below 0.70 | 0 | 4 | +4 |

*S&P 500 = 1.00

**Sample of the 200 largest equity funds.


Then, Long-Term Shareholders, Now . . . ? Equity Fund Redemption Rates

Redemptions and Exchanges Out as a Percentage of Average Net Assets



Source: Investment Company Institute

Redemption Rates U.S. and International Equity Funds




Challenges Faced by Investors in Active Funds

1. High Costs—2% annual cost = 63% of the 50-year return on stocks.
2. Critical erosion (60%+) of dividend income.
3. Giant Size—Mutual funds own 33% of U.S. equities. “A fat wallet ... enemy of superior returns.”
4. High Turnover—130% of assets (purchases and sales).
5. Marketing—“We make what will sell.” Fund failure rate 50% per decade.
6. Investor (and salesman) focus on past returns.
7. Outside ownership of managers (39 of top 50).

RESULT: Stewardship descends, salesmanship ascends

Do Costs Matter? A Powerful Example




“The Arithmetic of All-In Investment Expenses”¹³
Financial Analysts Journal


| | Actively Managed Fund | Index Fund |
|------------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Expense Ratio | 1.12% | 0.06% |
| Transaction Costs | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| Cash Drag | 0.15 | 0.00 |
| Sales Charges/Fees | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| All-In Expenses | 2.27% | 0.06% |
| Tax Inefficiency | 0.75 | 0.30 |
| Total Costs | 3.02% | 0.36% |
| Gross Return (assumed) | 7.00% | 7.00% |
| Net Return | 3.98% | 6.64% |
| Loss in Annual Return | -2.66% | |

Note: Counterproductive investor behavior (buying high and selling low) has historically reduced returns to active fund investors by another 1.5-2.0% annually according to Morningstar.

The Miracle of Compounding Long-Term Returns Without the Tyranny of Compounding Long-Term Costs¹⁴



Dividend Yields and Expense Ratios¹⁵




Source: Morningstar. Note: Index fund yields and expenses for Vanguard Admiral share classes.

Better than the Morningstar Rating System?¹⁶

“Investors should make expense ratios a primary test in fund selection. They are still the most dependable predictor of performance.”

Russel Kinnel
Morningstar, August 2010



**Lack of Persistence in Performance
of Active Mutual Funds** 18.

| Rankings for the 5 years ending 2009 | Where they ranked in the subsequent 5 years | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | 5-Year Return* | Number of Funds | Highest Quintile | Lowest Quintile | Merged/Closed |
| 1 | Highest | 1,091 | 14% | 24% | 10% |
| 2 | High | 1,083 | 12 | 16 | 22 |
| 3 | Medium | 1,084 | 15 | 13 | 26 |
| 4 | Low | 1,085 | 14 | 10 | 38 |
| 5 | Lowest | 1,032 | 14 | 9 | 45 |
| Total | | 5,375 | 14% | 14% | 28% |

*Excess return vs. benchmark.
Note: Number of failed funds—1,499

It's Not Just Me... Fama French, 2010 19.

“The 3% Solution”

“...[G]oing forward we expect that a portfolio of low cost index funds will perform **about as well as a portfolio of the top three percentiles of past active winners, and better than the rest of the active fund universe.”**

Source: “Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns,”
The Journal of Finance, October 2010

**Aren't There Mutual Funds That
Avoid These Problems?** 20.

Yes, but not very many.

Typical characteristics these funds share:

1. Managers, not marketers.
2. Reasonable expense ratios.
3. Low portfolio turnover.
4. Self-imposed stern limits on size.
5. Interim returns that may vary sharply from the market's return.
6. Investment professionals own and operate the management company.

“The Colossal Failure”

21.

“[T]he colossal failure of the mutual fund industry; resulting from [its] systematic exploitation of individual investors . . . extract[ing] enormous sums from investors in exchange for providing a shocking disservice. . . . Thievery, even when dressed in the cloak of SEC-approved governance, remains thievery . . . as the powerful financial services industry exploits vulnerable individual investors.”

David Swensen, manager of Yale University's endowment fund

Mutual Funds Are the Only Practical Option for Individual Investors

22.

“The vast majority of American families are sentenced to a lifetime of investing in the existing mutual fund penal system. But if they're smart, they'll do their time in an index fund.”

John Bogle
Grant's “Great Debate”

April 7, 2015


Enter Vanguard




23.

“The Vanguard plan actually furthers the objectives [of the Investment Company Act of 1940] by ensuring that the Funds' directors . . . are better able to evaluate the quality of services rendered to the funds . . . improved disclosure to shareholders . . . promotes savings from economies of scale . . . clearly enhances the Funds' independence . . . provides them with conflict-free control over distribution . . . and promotes a healthy and viable fund complex within which each fund can better prosper.” (Unanimous decision, 1981)

Strategy Follows Structure

24.





Vanguard's Key Strategy: Indexing 28.

1975—First Index Investment Trust





Initial Reaction →

Help Stamp Out Index Funds

UN AMERICAN

INDEX FUNDS ARE UNAMERICAN!

*Name changed to Vanguard 500 Index Fund in 1980.



A Speech Title Sums It Up

33.

Convergence!
The Great Paradox: Just as Active Fund Management Becomes More and More Like Passive Indexing, So Passive Indexing Becomes More and More like Active Fund Management

John C. Bogle
“The Art of Indexing” Conference
Washington, DC
September 30, 2004

“What Have They Done to My Song, Ma?” Enter the Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF)

34.

First Index Mutual Fund (1974)—Principles

- Own the U.S. stock market
- Diversify to the Nth degree
- Minimize transaction costs
- Tiny expense ratio—500 Index: 0.05% (Admiral)
- Bought to be held “forever” (redemption rate 10%)


Exchange-Traded Index Funds (1993)—Principles

- Pick your own index (1,100 now available)
- Diversify within sector you chose
- Lower expenses ... but not too low (0.50%)
- Bought to be traded (average annual turnover of large ETFs: 1244%)

ETF Turnover

35.

2014 Dollar Turnover as a Percentage of Average Annual Assets



ETFs—The New Way to Speculate

36.

2014 Trading Volume


100 Largest Stocks: \$18.6 Trillion
 100 Largest ETFs: \$15.7 Trillion

2014 Turnover Rate

100 Largest Stocks: 179%
 100 Largest ETFs: 1428%

Costs and Indexing— More Important than Ever

37.



What's a Competitor to Vanguard to Do?

38.

What's a race car driver to do when he's in last position?

- Increase speed—i.e., improve performance, more aggressive marketing, more money to distributors (a la life insurance)
- Reduce friction—i.e., cut fees, cut staff, cut research
- Copy the car in front—i.e., more indexing, less innovation
- Get a new car—i.e., focus on other lines of business, recordkeeping, benefit plans, venture capital, limousine services, etc.

The “Golden Rule” of the ‘40 Act

39.

Put the Shareholder First!


“... the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected ... when investment companies are organized, operated [and] managed ... in the interest of directors, officers, investment advisers ... [or] underwriters ... *rather than* in the interest of ... such companies' security holders ...”

Investment Company Act of 1940, Section 1.B.2.

Copernicus Turned Upside-Down

40.

Average Mutual Fund Group
Total Net Assets \$25 Billion



Why isn't the sun—500 times
the size of the planet—at the
center of *this* universe?

Average Fund
Management Company
Total Net Assets \$50 Million



1993 data from *Bogle on Mutual Funds: New Perspectives for the Intelligent Investor*

Tiny Transaction Transforms Giant Industry ^{41.}

Transaction: Owners of ISI (book value \$300,000) sold the manager to other investors for 14 times book value (\$4.2 million).

SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 1958

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that ISI could sell its fiduciary obligation to its fund shareholders, opening the floodgates to IPOs, mergers, “trafficking” in management contracts, and acquisitions of fund management companies.


By the mid-1960s, a score of fund management firms went public, including industry leaders Wellington, Vance Sanders, Dreyfus, Franklin and Putnam. Later, MFS, T. Rowe Price, State Street, American Century, Oppenheimer, Alliance, AIM, Delaware, and many others.

It Wasn't Supposed to Be That Way... ^{42.}

For Paul Cabot, president of State Street Investment Trust, the private ownership of fund managers was essential. Indeed it represented a moral imperative for him, and he sharply criticized firms that would sell out to insurance companies and other financial institutions.* In 1971, he recalled the negotiations over the Investment Company Act of 1940: “Both the SEC and our industry committee agreed that the management contract between the fund and the management group was something that belonged ... to the fund ... and therefore the management group had no right to sell it ... or to make money on the disposition of this contract ... the fiduciary does not have the right to sell his job to somebody else at a profit.”

*In 1982, the private owners of State Street Management sold their company to the (ironically then-mutual) Metropolitan Life Insurance for a profit of \$100 million.

Ownership of 50 Largest Mutual Fund Management Companies—2015 ^{43.}



Public Ownership and Professional Organizations ^{44.}

From my 1971 speech to the partners of Wellington Management Company:

I reveal an ancient prejudice of mine: All things considered ... it is undesirable for professional enterprises to have public stockholders ... The pressure for earnings and earnings growth engendered by public ownership is antithetical to the responsible operation of a professional organization.

Note: Wellington, now private, was then publicly-owned.

Fiduciary Duty A Precept as Old as Holy Writ

45.

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.

Matthew 6:24

What's To Be Done?

46.

1. Reduce Conflicts
2. Disclose Conflicts

Reducing Conflicts: Structural Changes

47.

- Funds' board chairman must be an independent director*
- Board must have independent staff, reporting to the chairman*
- Regulation should move its focus from individual funds (industry, 1924-1940) to fund complexes (today's industry)
- Ultimately, *mutualization* (full or partial)

*Applicable only to managers supervising assets of long-term funds of \$25 billion or more, and operating 20 or more funds. In 2015, the 50 largest fund managers have aggregate assets of \$12.4 trillion, 86% of the industry's long-term assets.

Sunlight—Disclosing Conflicts

48.

Improvements in Prospectus Disclosure

All investors should have access to these data:

- Redemption Rate—Redemptions + exchanges out as a percentage of average fund assets
- Fund expenses—percentage of investment income
- Fund return (time-wtd) vs. investor return (asset-wtd)
- Long-term vs. short-term capital gains distributions
- Turnover—Total purchases + total sales as a percentage of average fund assets
- All-in compensation of 5 highest-paid fund officers (comprehensive)
- Investment Advisory Fees—Rates **and** dollars (10-year history of each) *Jones v. Harris Associates*

What's All This about "Basis Points?"

49.

Jones v. Harris Associates
Brief for John C. Bogle as *Amicus Curiae*
in Support of Petitioners

It is important to distinguish between the already-high *rates* (as a percentage of assets) that advisers charge and the even more excessive dollar *amounts* that are produced by those fee rates. It was the huge increase in mutual fund assets and, therefore, the amount of mutual fund fees, that concerned the SEC in 1966, since the cost of providing advisory services (essentially, managing an investment portfolio) rises far more slowly than the fees generated by taking a percentage of the increase in assets. Yet courts have generally acceded to the advisers' desire to frame any debate about fees in percentage—not dollar—terms, thereby giving advisers a license to charge fees that are unjustifiable by any standard.

High-Priced Index Funds and Fiduciary Duty

50.

What were directors of these funds thinking?
S&P 500 Index Funds with Expense Ratios of 0.40% or More

| Fund | Assets | Expense Ratio |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Principal Large Cap S&P 500 Index | \$4.7 B | 0.74% |
| Voya US Stock Index | 4.6 B | 0.66 |
| Columbia Large Cap Index | 3.7 B | 0.83 |
| MM S&P 500 Index | 3.6 B | 0.68 |
| Dreyfus S&P 500 Index | 2.9 B | 0.50 |
| JP Morgan Equity Index* | 1.9 B | 1.20 |
| Total (87 Funds) | \$19.3 B | 0.85% |
| Vanguard 500 Index-Admiral Shares | \$143 B | 0.05% |
| -Institutional Plus Shares | \$85 B | 0.02% |

* "A" series shares carry an expense ratio of 0.45% and a sales load of 5.25%

The Wisdom of Warren Buffett

51.

About Mutual Fund "Independent" Directors:

"Companies are not looking for Dobermans on the board; they are looking for cocker spaniels. Then they make sure their tails are wagging."

"Negotiating with oneself seldom produces a barroom brawl."

Warren Buffett

Corporate Pensions: The Elusive 8%

52.

Corporate pension funds make unreasonable assumptions about future returns

Pension de-risking and high expected returns are not compatible.

Example: IBM

| Asset Allocation | Asset Allocation | Required Return | Reasonable Assumptions |
|--|------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| Bonds | 56% | 3.75% | 3% |
| Stocks | 25 | 13.6 | 4 |
| Others (Hedge Funds, Private Equity, etc.) | 19 | 18.5 | 10 |
| Total/Gross Return | 100% | 9.0% | 4.6% |
| Less Investment Costs | | -1.0% | -1.0% |
| Net Return | | 8.0% | 3.6% |

The Road to Fiduciary Duty

53.

1. **Price Competition**
 - **Investor experience**
 - **Investor awareness**
 - **Complete disclosure**
2. **Awaken the Independent Directors**
 - **Awareness**
 - **Board structure**
 - **Mutualize?**
3. **Lawmakers/Regulators**
 - **DOL—Retirement Plans**
 - **SEC—Mutual Funds**
 - **Dodd-Frank**

Believe me—WE **WILL** GET THERE!

The Wisdom of Adam Smith

54.

“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it.”

The Wealth of Nations
1776